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THE INTUITIVE GEOMETRY OF
SPINOZA AND VERMEER
Russell B. Gill

^oth Benedict de Spinoza and Johannes Vermeer work
^^iin precise, rational ways. The one composes an ethics
y"demonstrated in geometric order," a notable attempt
to impose rational methodology on humane subject matter.
The other paints still, precise subjects that are as much portraits
of geometrical volumes as of the commonplace scenes and
people of Delft. Yet each artist invests his rationality with an
unusual degree of feeling. Bertrand Russell calls Spinoza the
most "lovable of the great philosophers"; Kenneth Clark notes
that Vermeer's "scientific approach to experience ends in
poetry."^ In their quiet ways the two men, both born in 1632
in Holland, exhibit a baroque ability to create impressive
unions of opposite qualities—god and nature, conventional
' Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Sctuster, 1945), 569; and Kenneth Clark, Civilisation: A Personal View (New
York; Harper and Row, 1969), 212.
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genre scenes and personal vision, and, especially, uncompromis
ing rationality and deep feeling.
Spinoza and Vermeer are bourgeois visionaries, possessors of
a vision at once mathematical and imaginative, rationalists who
see ordinary life under the aspect of eternity. "The Mind feels
those things that it conceives in understanding" {Ethics 5 P23 S),
Spinoza writes, and he means by "feeling" something like a
quiet intuition of eternity, an imderstanding that grasps the
essence of things. "We feel and know by experience that we are
eternal," he writes in the same context.^ For both artists, a
rational imderstanding is a felt experience. Both attempt to
forge a new synthesis of disparate elements in an intellectually
shifting age, and the result is less stable system than baroque
energy. The cool precision of their art is more than rational
method; it is a symbol or emotionally charged instance of a
desire to express inner order and reason.
The seventeenth-century concept of "intuition" includes an
interplay of feeling and reason that makes it an apt description
of the visionary spirit with which Spinoza and Vermeer infuse
their work. In both classical and later Latin, the word carries
connotations of adimration as well as of sight and contempla
tion. These connotations continue in the use of "intuition" by
Descartes and other seventeenth-century thinkers, who regarxl
it as the source of first principles, a concept known directly,
without inference from prior ideas, on which rbains of
discursive reasoning can be based. Intuition is characterized by
its clarity and the immediacy with which it arises in the mind,
so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt,"
as Descartes notes.^ Intmtion has the clarity of sight and the
immediacy of the emotions. Even Locke uses expressive
^ Quotations of Spinoza's Ethics are from Collected Works of Spinoza, trans. Edwin
Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), vol. 1.
' Rtdes for the Direction of the Mind, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans.
Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1967), 1: 7. For a note on seventeenth-century use of "intuition," see Curley, ed..
Collected Works of Spinoza, 1: 641-2.
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language to describe it. "Like bright sunshine," he writes,
intuition "forces itself immediately to be perceived.""*
Pascal does not use the term directly, but he appropriates the
idea, especially its "feeling" coimotations. "Principles are
intuited, propositions are inferred" is a standard English
translation oipensee 282; in French, Pascal writes, "/es principes
se sentent," talcing advantage of the connotations of "feeling."^
Because intuition does not depend on prior knowledge, it
occupies a privileged status for Pascal. As a religious apologist,
he uses it to isolate and protect the non-rational faculties: "We
know truth, not only by reason, but also by the heart, and it
is in this last way that we know first principles; and reason,
which has no part in it, tries in vain to impugn them....For the
knowledge of first principles, as space, time, motion, number,
is as sure as any of those which we get from reasoning. And
reason miwt trust these intuitions of the heart [connaissances du
coeur]" (282). These intuitions are the heart's reasons, which
reason itself does not know (277).
Of the seventeenth-century philosophers, Spinoza most
imaginatively explores the potential of intuition to combine
reason and feeling. Like Descartes, he recognizes a nondiscursive faculty of understanding from which reason can
proceed, and like Pascal he includes its emotional connotations.
His primary use of "intuition" is reserved for the highest kirirl
of knowledge, a combination of understanding and blessedness
{Ethics 5, P31). And it is with an exploration of the "true peace
of mind," even the "salvation," due to this intuitive knowledge
that he ends the Ethics. Such a use of intuition is in keeping
with the imaginative power of his great work. The Ethics is not
an explication of a limited philosophical or political issue, but
a world system, a totality, a heartfelt search for rational unity
* An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (New
York: Dover, 1959), 2: 177.
^ Pascal's Pensees, trans. F. W. Tnouer (New York, E. P. Button, 1958); and
Oeuvres de Blaise Pascal, ed. Leon Brunschvic^ (Paris: Libraire Hachette, 1925), vol.
13. Numbers refer to the individual pensees in the Brunschvicg edition.
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in the conflicts of later seventeenth-century Dutch life.^ What
in fact separates Spinoza's system from other less encompassing
ones is his ability to intuit in the solidness of the physical
world a vision of larger unity and value. Likewise, an intuition
of deeper values within geometrical surfaces characterizes
Vermeer's genius. A highly developed imaginative faculty
invested with evident feeling acts through a rational and
methodical sensibility in these artists to give life, wider interest,
and lasting appeal to their works.
The Elhics progresses from its resolute opening demonstra
tion that there can be only one substance to its conclusion in
visionary "divine Love or blessedness." The work is an ethics
based on a metaphysics, an all-inclusive scheme.^ Spinoza finds
that mind and matter are different ways of conceiving the same
underlying substance, which he calls God or Nature: "The
Mind and the Body, are one and the same Individual, which is
conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the
attribute of Extension" {Ethics 2 P21 S; also 2 P7 S). Although
humans can comprehend only these two attributes of God or
Nature, infinite being must consist of an infinite number of
additional attributes. In effect, Spinoza creates an imaginatively
appealing theory that has affinities not only with modern
Identity Theory, which holds that mind and brain are two
versions of the same thing, but also with the visions of William
Blake, who knew that everything would appear infinite if the
doors of perception were cleansed.
' Spinoza and Vermeer have seemed so self-contained that their place in baroque
ctiltural history has been obscured. Jose Antonio Maravall, for instance,
compliments the Ethics as "far beyond the conceptual schemes of the baroque" and
misses the similarities that Vermeer's geometry shares with contemporary attempts
in painting to create an "enriched view of reality." See Maravall, Culture of the
Baroque; Analysis of a Historical Structure, trans. Terry Cochran (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 64, 259.
^ See Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method; A Reading of Spinoza's "Ethics"
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4-6; and Stuart Hampshire, Taw
Theories of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 5.
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Spinoza sets forth the way to escape from time and external
causation and, rather, to come into a state of blessedness, to
become less reactive and more active. By moving up the ladder
of tmderstanding from fallible senses, language, and opinion, the
wise person progresses through reason, or adequate ideas of the
properties of things, tmtil he or she arrives at the highest kind
of knowledge, intuition {Ethics 2 P40 S2). Intuitive knowledge
is not a reaction to individual things, but an active understand
ing of the basic conditions under which all things must exist in
this world. It conceives things sub specie aeternitatis, under the
aspect of eternity, as necessarily involving the "eternal and
infinite essence of God" {Ethics 5 P29, 30, 31). Without denying
the multifarious aspects of our material life, Spinoza (and
Vermeer too, as we shall see) shows us the way to see them
tmder the form of eternity, with an "intellectual Love of God,"
an intuitive understanding of the eternal perfections of God or
Nature.
Spinoza's geometrical method, his attempt to demonstrate
the consequences of intuitive knowledge of God, is imagina
tively and aesthetically powerful. It is the record of a mind
"feeling" the essence of its existence. Spinoza is drawn to the
beauty of that science, as Plato writes in the Symposium, which
"is absolute, existing alone with itself, unique, eternal." The
geometrical method in the Ethics is an appropriate form of
Spinoza's search for unity, an effective expression of the
demonstrable certainty that he thought human knowledge could
reach. Its appeal stems from its symbolic representation of
values rather than from its geometrical or even logical exactness.
Commonly, modern studies find Spinoza's method "invalid and
unrescuable," without concluding that Spinoza is less than a
major philosopher.^ This paradox can be resolved by an
' See Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's "Ethics" (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1984), 16-28; R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1985), 3-30; and Herman De Dijn, "Conceptions of Philosophical
Method in Spinoza: Logica and Mos Geometricus," Review of Metaphysics 40
(1986): 55-78.
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vinderstanding that his logic is compromised (and enhanced) byits symbolic and expressive function. Ironically, to a significant
degree, it is those difficult chains of propositions and proofs
that give the Ethics greater imaginative impact than his other
-works possess. In their tmcompromising application we can
sense the remarkable feeling that ultimately justifies Spinoza's
geometrical order. To analyze the Ethics without placing his
method within the context of baroque ideals is to miss its
motivating force and chief import.
No doubt Spinoza's apparatus of definitions, axioms,
propositions, and corollaries is an extreme example of
seventeenth-century attempts to match one's style to the
physical structures of reality, a naive episode in the early age of
modern science. But as the paintings of Vermeer and his Dutch
contemporaries Pieter Saenredam and Emanuel de Witte show,
it is a conceptually powerful episode and one whose appeal
persists. Saenredam and de Witte paint Calvinist church
interiors stripped of their earlier Catholic ornament but,
nevertheless, beautiful arrangements of lines, shapes, and
volirmes of light. The melancholy fascination of Nicolas
Poussin's Landscape with the Burial of Phocion (1648) testifies to
the imaginative power that mathematically pure lines can have.
Its vision of contained trees, geometrical buildings, precise lines,
and orderly arrangement is strangely pleasing, encouraging
contemplation of an imaginary ideal. Three centuries later, Piet
Mondrian's joyful lines and colorful spaces achieve a Utopian
purity very different from the paintings of Poussin and these
earlier Dutch artists, but close kin in its dependence on the
power of a vision of clarity and certainty. The appeal of these
works is intuitive. Like Spinoza's Ethics, they "feel" the
rational beauty of primary forms—of space and lines and the
first principles at the heart of human understanding.
It is instructive to contrast the all-encompassing and
imaginative baroque scheme of the Ethics (and of a kindred
work like Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan) with the graceful
diffidence of the introductory sections of John Locke's great
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Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Born in the same year
as Spinoza and Vermeer, Locke lived a longer, more public life,
and his thought has affinities with the rising neo-classicism.
Although his work is comprehensive and, indeed, long enough,
Locke does not think of himself as building a complete system.
Nor does he invest his reasoning with the depth of feeling
found in Spinoza's intuitive imderstanding. His title is
purposefully modest—an "essay" or attempt—in contrast to the
confident assertiveness of the titles Leviathan and Ethics
Demonstrated in Geometric Order. His subject is certainly vast,
but Locke stresses its limitations; "I shall not at present meddle
with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself
to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of
our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any
sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings" (1:
26). Here, Locke dissociates his work from both the ancient
interest in essences (very much a concern of Spinoza's) and the
contemporary interest in the physiological or material origins
of psychology that interested Spinoza as well as Hobbes. "It is
ambition enough," Locke writes in a more graceful and
disarming manner than ever did Spinoza or Hobbes, "to be
employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little,
and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to
knowledge" (1: 14).
In contrast with Locke's modest opening, the Ethics begins
with ardent seriousness: there is no epistle, no introduction
whatsoever. Spinoza latmches immediately into numbered
definitions of substance, attribute, mode, and God. Clearly,
Spinoza is not writing an essay; here is no mere "attempt," but,
rather, a treatise on essence and existence, the interconnectedness of all things. Here is a baroque synthesis, characterized by
forceful energy rather than gentlemanly grace.
Locke's
persuasive ease would be utterly inappropriate for Spinoza, who
is not persuading a circle of gentlemen friends but "demonstrat
ing" in certain, mathematical terms a system of truth to the
unenlightened. Though Spinoza was rejected by religious
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communities, he has the marks of a "true believer" or, to put
it less anachronistically, he, like Milton, intends to soar "with
no middle flight" to the height of his great Argument—his
strenuous, unifying vision—and justify the ways of God (or
Nature) to men. The result is a baroque synthesis, strained but
charged with latent energy.
Vermeer's paintings also proceed from deep feeling and
demanding rationality. A common first reaction to his series of
meditative women is a puzzled distancing. Their meticulous
surfaces exhibit a purity seemingly removed from human
personality. Somehow the heart of the painting is not caught
by the ostensible subject—a music lesson, a love letter, a pearl
necklace. But Vermeer uses the specific instance for larger
purposes. Like Saenredam and de Witte, he captures the beauty
of austere form but goes further into making real its iimer
dimensions. His work demonstrates the imaginative and
emotional power possible in a rational vision.
The viewer who lingers at one of Vermeer's paintinp is
drawn firmly into its inner spaces until they raise to conscious
ness a submerged awareness of substantial light and space,
perhaps remnants of moments in childhood when motes in a
sunbeam were alive and the stillness of afternoon light in one's
room had a reality, almost a palpability, lost to the adult.
There develops a sympathetic resonance between Vermeer's
rational forms and the intimate bonds with pure line and space
that lie at the base of the brain's orientation to reality. The
attentive viewer senses below the surfaces of that meticulous
realism the inherent spatial and temporal coordinates of being.
Vermeer conveys to us a quiet awareness of eternity within
ordinary life achieved through contemplation of its basic forms.
The highest knowledge for Vermeer, as well as for Spinoza,
may be appropriately called intuition, a manner of apprehen
sion available only to the disciplined mind that can drive
directly to the heart of an experience without distraction from
extraneous matters. Both artists intuitively touch truths at the
still core of existence, there to be felt only by the person whose
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qviiet heart is no longer prey to time and external causation.
Neither Spinoza nor Vermeer travels widely; theirs is the
intuitive journey within, the discovery of eternity within their
own rooms.
It is to be expected that such a quiet, profoimd imagination
should see life maturely and all of a piece. Vermeer's style
evolves, of course, but taken together, the thirty-odd paintings
that remain of his work exhibit a remarkable unity. Favorite
motifs reappear, recurring faces, the same room, volumes of
space lit from windows on the left, the tiled floors, pictures on
rear walls enigmatically hinting at an anecdote in Vermeer's
own painting, the yellows and blues, the folds of cloth and
rugs, and, most of all, the deep stillness at the heart of common
life. From the early meditation of Mary with her cheek resting
on her hand to the sleeping girl and on to the various ladies at
guitars and virginals in the late paintings and to all the letter
writers and readers in between, there is a quiet patise that asks
us to view not so much the action as its meaning, to see this
aspect of ordinary life sub specie aeternitatis. Repeatedly, in
individual paintings, as well as in the entire corpus taken
together, there is a wholeness, a vision of the unity in which all
things reside.
In Lady and Gentleman at the Virginals [Fig. 1], rational
method and deep, controlled feeling beautifully complement
each other. Our eye is drawn from a low starting point on the
right, up diagonally through the full volume of space within the
room, from there along the back wall, and then down the rug
to the deep blue blacks and grays of the marble tile. This
circling line of sight encompasses the volume of space in the
room and brings us back again to the light in the far corner.
We are presented the inside of a cube of light. The seated
viewpoint enlarges the table and rug, and their location toward
the front of the painting gives the eye a reference against which
to measure the interior space, a common device in Vermeer s
paintings. The large curves of the viola da gamba add to our
sense of contained volumes. The horizontal lines of the
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virginals extending straight across the rear of the room, together
with the rectangular planes of the picture on the wall, the
mirror, the window wall, and the rhomboids of floor tile,
botmd that volume in an almost abstract play of geometry.
Repeatedly, Vermeer composes his paintings in a window-lit
corner like this, drawing us into a vortex of light and space felt
so intensely as to seem material. It is as if Spinoza were
contemplating the palpability of Vermeer's light when he wrote
that an idea and its object are the same thing though expressed
in two ways {Ethics 2 P7).
Vermeer's imagination is of the highest order, not the
obvious sort that portrays heavens and myths or distorted
reality symbolic of the ineffable; rather, he is able so to
burnish ordinary reality that its unseen qualities shine through.
His windows do not look out on other worlds, but bring light
to the interior of the world before us. Vermeer presents
material reality in such a way that we feel its essence. Van
Gogh wrote, apropos of Vermeer, that "the Dutch had no
imagination."' But we are in a position now to appreciate a
sort of imagination different from one conditioned by a century
of Romanticism. Although the idiosyncrasies of Van Gogh's
Starry Night or El Greco's Toledo show us dimensions beyond
ordinary life, they do not ask us to earn that vision as Vermeer
does. We see Van Gogh's own imagination, but in Vermeer's
quiet realism we ourselves move through ordinary sight to the
infinite within it. Vermeer shows us not transformed space, but
space as we ourselves see it and then pulls us into the realiza
tion of its infiniteness.^°
' See Ludw^ Goldscheider, Johannes Vermeer; The Paintings, Complete Edition
(London: Phaidon Press, 1958), 8.
Studies looking beyond Vermeer's realism have most often limited themselves
to the overt allegory. But Vermeer is more interested in reality as an aspea of
eternity than as a literal equivalent of the spiritual. A helpful examination of
metaphor and appearance in Vermeer's paintings is David R. Smith, "Irony and
Civility: Notes on the Convergence of Genre and Ponraiture in SeventeenthCentury Dutch Painting," Art Bulletin 69 (1987): 407-30.
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Rising buildings reflect an unearthly silver light emanating
from the contorted clouds in El Greco's Toledo. We have never
seen any place on earth so mystically charged. Even the grass
in the foregrovmd seems to writhe as if losing itself in an
ecstatic echo of that spiritually surging sky. But the soft liquid
clouds of Vermeer's View of Delft [Fig. 2] belong to recogniz
able weather patterns of this earth. They do not lead to
heaven; rather, they form a natural cover over the city, an
explanation and contrast for the patches of light and shadow
bathing the buildings. Delft is not suspended between earth and
heaven, but contained between clouds and water as an island is.
Neither the sky nor the reflections in the water show us
another realm, for their charm lies in being beautifully exact
representations of just what they are. Toledo is exhatxsting; in
it the eye swirls upward to the infimte. Delft is comforting; its
horizontal lines draw the eye back and forth across solid
buildings. These structures are far enough away for fine details
to resolve into basic geometrical shapes: turret cones, steeple
cylinders, masonry arches, gable triangles, residential cubes.
The mind can find assurance and certainty in them as if they
were the precise stages in one of Spinoza's geometrical proofs.
The appeal is to the rational imagination: the delight we have
felt from an early age in primal shapes, in lines and blocks and
things contained. And there is a sense of eternal recurrence in
the stillness of the two women as they pause in conversation
beside the flat reflections in the canal.
But there is more than the comfort of this archetypal
experience, for the darkened front row of buildings opens into
an inner city of golden light on distant roofs. We see that there
are further spaces to explore and delight in. The curve of the
Schie and the forward projecting Rotterdam gate and boats on
the right, the break in the shadows on the water that leads our
eye beneath the bridge arch, and the darker clouds that hover
above us in the front of the painting, all create a sense of
enclosure even in this open city and carry us through a funnel
of liquid clouds and water, tmder the waiting arch, and into the
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sunlit city beyond. As our mind wanders deeper into the
depths of this painting, we come to realize that it is not the
buildings and the substance of the city that intrigue us but the
shapes, the geometry, especially the funnel of shadows that
make us experience the foregrotmd of the painting as an
enclosed volume issuing through that darkened arch into the
promise of half-hidden but open light and space in the distance.
Here, in bourgeois Delft, Vermeer's rational imagination leads
us to feel the forms of eternity in ordinary life."
The ability of a rational vision to achieve emotional depth
is nowhere clearer than in the reductiveness of Spinoza and
Vermeer. Disciplined sensibilities operating on the facts of
ordinary life look for the essence of things and reduce
experience to a unity of basic forms. To cite examples, Spinoza
is reductive in his restatement of normative language in
empirical terms: "By good I shall understand what we certainly
know to be useful to us" {Ethics 4 Dl). Because Spinoza
believes that values originate in humans, he reduces value claims
to psychological terms. And it is obvious too that Vermeer's
values are adequately stated in the ordinary people and physical
objects of bourgeois Delft. These instances of reductive thought
are very much a part of the new scientific spirit. Vermeer did
not hesitate to use a camera obscura, the fashionable contempo
rary device that rendered perspective "scientifically." Spinoza
is eager to see through the surface of things to a more basic
nature and to reduce clouded ideas to clear and distinct ones.
In tbis way, his work is like La Rochefoucauld's Maximes, Sir
Thomas Browne's Pseudodoxia Epidemica, and a host of other
seventeenth-century works whose purpose was to uncover the
"vulgar errors" of an unenlightened past.
Spinoza is a "nothing-but" philosopher, eager to show how
inadequate and false ideas can be reduced to "nothing but" some
" For appreciation of "restored unity of the material and the spiritual" in
Vermeer's art, see Gilles Aillaud, "The Hidden Eye," in Albert Blankert, John
Michael Montias, and Gilles Aillaud, eds., Vermeer (New York: Rizzoli, 1988), 11.
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thing more basic, more empirical, or less dependent on the
defects of our knowledge. "Love is nothing but Joy with the
accompanying idea of an external cause," according to Spinoza.
"Hope is nothing but an inconstant Joy"; "the knowledge of
good and evil is nothing but an affect of Joy or Sadness"; and
so on {Ethics 3 P13, 18; 4 PS). This pugnacious refusal to accept
clouded and self-serving ideas continues to be an attractive
aspect of his philosophy. But while the reductive impulse
reduces the number of explanatory principles, it also expands
the comprehensiveness or applicability of each principle. These
reductive maxims are steps in the creation of his great umfied
system. From this unity Spinoza's reductive maxims gain a
suggestiveness and depth that even La Rochefoucauld's lack.
In Spinoza's insistently syntactic or connective style, the
circuitous flow of ordinary language reduces to a driving
movement from premise to proof. Nothing stands alone; all
is unified in deductive chains of ideas. He is indeed capable of
including eloquent touches (see the well-known examples at the
beginning of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and
the end of the Ethics), but characteristically his dry seven
teenth-century academic Latin patises for nothing extra. Take,
for a short example, his proof of the proposition that "the
greatest satisfaction of Mind there can be arises from this third
kind of knowledge" (intuition):
Dem.: The greatest virtue of the Mind is to know God
(by IVP28), or to understand things by the third kind of
knowledge (by P25). Indeed, this virtue is the greater, the
more the Mind knows things by this kind of knowledge
(by P24). So he who knows things by this kind of
knowledge passes to the greatest human perfection, and
consequently (by Def. Aff. II), is affected with the greatest
Joy accompanied (by IIP43) by the idea of himself and his
virtue. Therefore (by Def. Aff. XXV), the greatest
satisfaction there can be arises from this kind of knowl
edge, q.e.d. {Ethics 5 P27)
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In this uncompromising attempt to reduce style to geometrical
order, Spinoza interconnects its parts to the point of clotting.
The clauses are bound each to each with such an insistent
succession of logical connectives (or, so, consequently,
therefore) and then so studded with references to the previous
propositions on which they depend that the meaning must
rather be extracted than read. For all the breadth and depth of
its implications, for all the humaneness of its appealing ideas, its
style is so severe that we must sacrifice ready comprehension to
Spinoza's struggle for certainty. Yet this fiercely reductive style
is itself one of his admirable characteristics. "All things
excellent are as difficult as they are rare" is the high-minded
closing of the Ethics. The severity of that formidable compen
dium of deductive logic contains profotmd and expansive
implications.
Basically, Spinoza's proposition is a Platonic umon of
imderstanding, virtue, and happiness to which he has added
several characteristic changes. The understanding is not
knowledge in general, but intuitive knowledge, that insight into
the essence of things arrived at through an understanding of the
attributes of God or nature. The consequent happiness has a
deepness and resonance typical of Spinoza: it is "the greatest
Joy," "the greatest satisfaction." In related propositions, this
happiness is associated with the "intellectual Love of God,"
"blessedness," and "salvation" {Ethics 5 P32, 33, 42). "Satisfac
tion" translates acquiescientia, a state of both rejoicing and peace
from desires. Spinoza's proposition is literally cosmic in its
implications—profound and joyful together, anything but dry.
Vermeer too has a reductive sensibility, though not of course
in a strictly philosophical manner. Narration reduces to the
objects before him, to what the eye sees. The hints at a story,
the deference to genre conventions, the suggestions of allegory
never really develop beyond the objects in the painting. That
is the strangeness of his Allegory of the Faith [Fig. 3], an allegory
in which the spiritual aspects of Faith are unapologetically
stated in empirical terms. Faith in this painting is a big-bos-
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Figure 1: Vermeer, Lady and Gentleman at the Virginals.
Gjurtesy The Royal CoUeaion. 1993. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth n.
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Figure 3: Vermeer, Allegory of the Faith.
Q)urtesy The Metropolitan Museum of An,
Bequest of Michael Friedsam, 1931; The Friedsam Collenion (32.100.18).
All rights reserved. The Metropolitan Museum of An.
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Figure 4: Vermeer, The Geographer.i
Courtesy Stadelsches Kunstinstitut.
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omed, solid, and fleshly woman with large hands and feet,
massive legs, a full and oval face like one of Vermeer's maids,
seated in what has been called an indecent posture. The
accoutrements of Faith are all too obvious, as if they were the
products of an overly rational mind that wished to number and
list them. Vermeer has, in fact, taken many of them from a
manual of iconology—apple, crushed snake, cornerstone, Bible,
and so on.
In spite of the contrived spirituality of a pose with foot on
globe, hand over heart, and upward gaze. Faith sits solidly in
her physical surroimdings. She is placed in an enclosed area
defined by heavy objects, large rug curtain, and a beamed
ceiling. The suspended crystal ball at which Faith gazes seems
to reflect, in a matter-of-fact and conventional way, the room
in which Vermeer paints rather than something overtly
spiritual. Even the handsome play of light on the white gown
of Faith serves more to emphasize the shiny curves of her large
voltime than to add a luminescent spirituality to the piece. But
whatever the painting may owe to the Catholicism of
Vermeer's family or to the Jesuits situated nearby his residence
in Delft, Allegory of the Faith is exactly what we would expect
in a religious piece by Vermeer. The orderliness, physicality,
and contained space, so characteristic of his other paintings,
mark the Allegory as an instance of his love of the rational and
physical aspects of experience. If the painting does not succeed
as well as others, perhaps it is because Vermeer begins with an
abstract concept (faith) instead of the concrete object. He has
reduced the spiritual to the physical rather than found eternity
within the everyday world. The commonplace result lacks the
inner feeling of a painting like The Geographer, where the
reduction works in the opposite direction.
In The Geographer [Fig. 4], the globe, the maps, and the
windows out of which the yotmg geographer gazes are symbols
of the larger world. Yet the heart and meaning of the painting
lie within the room, in the volumes of the rug and furniture, in
the enclosing corner of the room, and in the color and mass of
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his blue robe with its red sash. The globe is another volume,
the wall map encompassed in a heavy frame is another
prominent geometrical shape, the windows are really means of
illuminating the interior of the room rather than of looking out
into the open world. Although Vermeer suggests the larger
subject, he finds his vision within. The intent gaze of that
geographer is not at the objects of the external world, but at
their essence; the painting portrays the intuitive knowledge,
which abandons "random experience" and conceives of things
as "contained in God and [following] from the necessity of the
divine nature" {Ethics 2 P40 S2, and 5 P29 S). It is a rapt
intuition of the implications of extension and volume—geo
graphy, that is, sub specie aeternitatis, Vermeer's "feeling" mind
intensifies his painting by reducing geography from external
objects to intuitive unity.^^
Although Vermeer shares common genre conventions with
contemporaries like Pieter de Hooch and Gabrid Metsu, it is
never the expansiveness of the anecdote that marks his use of
the conventions, but the "reduction" of anecdote to resonant
form. To illustrate this point, we can compare the overt
supernatural of Rembrandt's Dr. Faustus with Vermeer's
superficially similar The Geographer, the dominance of anecdote
in De Hooch's A Maid with a Child in a Court (either version)
with Vermeer's A Street in Delft, or the actual music lesson in
Metsu's A Man and a Woman Beside a Virginal with the inner
profundity of Vermeer's Lady and Gentleman at the Virginals.
Vermeer uses the ordinary subject, the common genre
convention, but pushes beyond its surface story. Those pictures
of Cupids, procuresses, maps, and even Last Judgments hanging
For more literal and overt allegorical views of the geometry in these paintings,
see James Welu, "Vermeer's Astronomer. Observations on an Open Book," Art
Bulletin 68 (1986): Ksi-fsJ-, and Per-Olov Elovsson, "The Geographer's Heart: A
Study of Vermeer's Scientists," Konsthistorisk Tidskrift 60 (1991): 17-25. But it
should be evident that at best (as in The Geographer) the allegorical parallels
between surface realism and inner meaning are more to be earned and intuited than
to be drawn easily and exaaly.
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on walls in the background of his paintings represent the
conventions according to which humans live but through which
Vermeer peers, reducing "random experience" to an intuition of
the geometrical eternity in which they all abide.
Vermeer's women are characteristically shown in profile, a
pose that emphasizes their conical volume more than a flat
front pose would, especially in the several paintings of
(seemingly) pregnant women. The body averted in profile and
Vermeer's other common practice of placing his figures behind
a table or musical instrument are also protective, defensive poses
that deny the openness of the woman. A psychological
interpretation of this denial is possible though irrelevant to the
heart of Vermeer's genius," for Vermeer is no more interested
in women as subjects in themselves than was Spinoza. They
serve as forms of the quiet commonplace and thus as especially
fruitful vessels of eternity. It is a measure of his respect for
them that he sees women as modes of his central interest.
Intuiting the eternity within the commonplace, Vermeer
reduces anecdote to form.
Vermeer's reduction (and expansion) of experience from life
to its geometrical correlative can be regarded as a baroque
fascination with opposites, a unification of disparate aspects of
experience that he shares with Spinoza. His reductive
sensibility creates a unifying vision of the infimte and the
eternal resonating in the light of enclosed volumes and
geometrical shapes. Subsequently, in neo-classical sensibilities,
that unity became even harder to maintain, for the synthesizing
vision seemed alien to a more empirical age. Later Dutch
painting sacrifices Vermeer's depth to a documentary record of
ordinary life. In 1726 Joseph Butler, the influential Anglican
bishop and ethical philosopher, saw only the reduction in
"nothing-but" philosophy. To claims like Hobbes's "benevo
lence is nothing but self-love," Butler replied that "everything
" See Lawrence Gowing, Vermeer (London: Faber and Faber, 1970); and Edward
A. Snow, A Study of Vermeer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
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is what it is, and not another thing.'"^'* The less presuming
empiricism of eighteenth-century thinkers tended to sever ideas
from deeper levels of causation and, rather, to concentrate on
the appearance, the idea as a given presentation before the
mind. In contrast, those earlier systems of Spinoza and
Vermeer, far from being merely reductionist, exemplify a
fleeting baroque ability to umfy disparate branches of
Imowledge and different ways of viewing the world, a
simtdtaneous reduction and synthesis. Both Spinoza and
Vermeer look with exceptional clarity at the material world
about them, but with a "feeling" mind of reason they enable us
to intmt its inner geometry, to see matter imder the form of
eternity.
' Five Sermons (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950), 15.

